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Ronald Coase (1910-2013)

By David A. Westbrook

Ronald Coase, professor of economics at
be called the negative externalities of an
the University of Chicago Law School and
activity. Coase pointed out that labeling an
winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, died
activity "a nuisance" was to give neighbors
on September 2, 2013, at the age of 102.
a right to be free of the nuisance, that is,
The influence of Coase's work is difficult to
was to create an entitlement on behalf of
exaggerate. In academic economics, he is
the neighbors. But one man's nuisance is
credited with founding institutional economoften another's livelihood. In Coase's exics. In law, he is credited with founding the
ample, we may ask whether a rancher has
most influential movement in the US legal
the right to let his cows roam, or does a
academy, law and economics, and his article
farmer have the right to have fields unmo"The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) is far and
lested by cows? Hurting one will help the
away the most cited text in the academic litother. (The reciprocal nature of rights was
David Westbrook
erature. More importantly still, because his
a big point made by the Yale legal scholar
work was so influential among policy makers trained in Hohfeld almost half century earlier.)
economics and/or law, Coase's work can be said to have
Coase argued that, in the absence of transaction costs,
shaped political economy itself over several decades.
the farmer and the rancher would bargain to reach an
I want to suggest that Coase's texts were so influential allocatively efficient solution: "the ultimate result
because they worked in essentially poetic ways -- he was (which maximises the value of production) is independprobably the most powerful mythmaker in political econ- ent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed
omy since Marx. Despite his intentions, Coase's work
to work without cost" (Coase, 1960, p. 8) If the rancher
presented a way of seeing the world that make great
had the right to let the cows roam, and farming was
sense not only to professors of economics, but also to
more valuable than cows, then the farmer would pay the
capitalists (and hence lobbyists and politicians), and to
rancher to fence the cattle in. If ranching was more
law professors, who should have known better. But I am valuable, then the farmer would take the loss, or pergetting ahead of myself.
haps abandon the land and do something else. If the
In awarding the Prize, the Swedish Royal Academy of
farmer had the right to keep the cows out, and ranching
Sciences cited two articles: "The Nature of the Firm"
was more valuable, then the rancher would pay the
(1937), which was ignored for many years, and the
farmer to waive his right to exclude the cows. Conaforementioned "The Problem of Social Cost."
versely, if farming was more valuable, than there would
The Nature of the Firm" begins with an observation:
be less ranching. Thus, it was argued -- more laborithe business world is composed of any number of relaously, of course -- that in a costless environment, the
tions that do not operate through a price mechanism.
original placement of entitlements did not matter, beAs he makes clear in his Nobel lecture, this is a problem cause the parties would contract to reach the economithat goes to the root of economics, which since Adam
cally efficient result. The economist George Stigler
Smith has argued that decentralized actors, coordinated named this proposition "the Coase Theorem," and so it
by prices, can make socially beneficial decisions. More- came to be called.
over, Smith argued, efficiency (and hence competitiveIt is important to note that for Coase, the case of barness) lay in specialization -- so why aren't most relations gaining in the absence of transaction costs was somegoverned by price? Why do firms exist? Or, since we
thing of a thought experiment, used to clarify thought,
observe firms, why isn't economic life conducted by one and perhaps a model. Transactions costs are always
big firm, i.e., why don't we have a planned economy?
positive, indeed were ordinarily significant, and thereWhy do we observe substantial, but incomplete decen- fore it is generally necessary to create entitlements -tralization of social decision making? Coase argued, as
this is the role of the law. The question for the law,
most of readers of this newsletter know, that contractthen, is to establish the optimal set of social arrangeing, operating in a market, was itself expensive. Finding ments:
willing buyers, haggling, and so forth imposes
in choosing between social arrangements within the
"transaction costs." Of course, management imposes its
context of which individual decisions are made, we
own costs. Therefore, argued Coase, societies use
have to bear in mind that a change in the existing sys"private" hierarchical relations, paradigmatically mastem which will lead to an improvement in some deciter/servant (now renamed, in agency law, emsions may well lead to a worsening of others. Furtherployer/employee) where transaction costs of contracting
more we have to take into account the costs involved
are thought to be higher than the analogous costs of
in operating the various social arrangements (whether
managing. Sometimes we buy, sometimes we build.
it be the working of a market or of a government de“The Problem of Social Cost " also turned on the conpartment), as well as the costs involved in moving to a
cept of transaction costs. Coase began a rather broad
new system. In devising and choosing between social
inquiry into the nature of welfare economics by focusing
arrangements we should have regard for the total efon the ancient doctrine of nuisance, or what would later
fect. (Coase, 1960, p. 44)
http://www.worldeconomicsassociation.org/
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As I read him, Coase thought he was mapping the
boundaries of markets, and in doing so, expanding the
domain of economic thinking to society writ large, where
markets were but one mode of ordering.
Transaction costs were used in the one case [in Theory of the Firm] to show that if they are not included
in the analysis, the firm has no purpose, while in the
other [in "The Problem of Social Cost"] I showed, as I
thought, that if transaction costs were not introduced
into the analysis, for the range of problems considered, the law had no purpose. (Coase, 1993, p. 62)
In one of the ironies of recent history, however, Coase
became famous for the Coase Theorem itself, understood as a fair description of a wide range of human relations. If there were no barriers to contract, then social
outcomes could be presumed to be the result of explicit
or implicit bargains, and hence efficient. If transaction
costs were in fact significant, government action
(notably regulation and judicial decision) might be taken
to create situations for which marketplace actors would
have bargained, thereby replicating the optimal allocation of costless markets. Doing this sensibly required
(deeply speculative) analysis of various alternative uses
of the factors of production. In light of the fact-intensive
and open-ended nature of such inquiries, it was perhaps
unsurprising that, at least in the United States, markets
would be presumed to pose no substantial barrier to
socially beneficial contracting. And given the costs of
bureaucratic regulation, and the risk that government
would abuse its monopoly of legitimate force, many in
the United States were quite inclined to agree with
Coase that often the best response to social cost "was to
do nothing about the problem at all," i.e., deregulate.
Thus was law and economics born.
It is important to emphasize that the misreading of
Coase is a matter of degree rather than of kind; converts
tend to zealotry. But Coase himself believed that the
price mechanism was the fundamental, and indeed preferred, mode of social ordering. In his Nobel acceptance
speech, Coase said:
The economy could be coordinated by a system of
prices (the "invisible hand") and, furthermore, with
beneficial results. . . . Economists have uncovered the
conditions necessary if Adam Smith's results are to be
achieved and where, in the real world, such conditions
do not appear to be found, they have proposed
changes which are designed to bring them about. . . .
What I endeavoured to do in the two articles cited by
the royal Swedish Academy of Sciences was to attempt to fill these gaps or more exactly to indicate the
direction in which we should move if they are ultimately to be filled. (Coase, 1991)
For Coase, markets were presumed, raising questions
why other forms of social ordering were necessary, and
insofar as they were, how to make their operations as
socially productive as possible. From this perspective, it
is unsurprising that, generally, Coase was unsympathetic
to regulation. Sometimes it is better to do "nothing
about the problem at all." More specifically, in somewhat less famous work, on matters like lighthouses and
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the distribution of the radio spectrum, Coase insisted
that markets could work quite well in lieu of government
action.
The stir raised by the (mis)reading of "The Problem of
Social Cost" led to a resurgent and vastly increased interest in "The Nature of the Firm." And so, approaching his
eighties, Coase was hailed as a sage. Fame is a strange
thing: authors do not get to decide if, when, or how their
ideas will be received. For his part, Coase spent another
(!) generation arguing, most notably in his Nobel Prize
acceptance speech, that (i) he was a rather simple mind
and not a great economist, and (ii) he had been substantially misunderstood. He found almost no agreement for
either proposition.
Both Coase's career and our fascination with prizes illustrate how deeply we remain influenced by the idea of
genius, and how problematic it is to talk about intellectual influence or even greatness as a property of an individual mind. Thoughts are taken up, or ignored, or
(de)formed to fit the interests of their times. For purposes of intellectual history, the fact that Coase was
somewhat misread is both easily overdone and irrelevant, as are substantial objections to Coase's ideas in
both theory and practice. At the end of illustrious lives it
is appropriate to ask after historical questions, e.g., why
did Coase's work so powerfully strike a chord when it did
-- which brings me back to the assertion that Coase was,
in spite of himself, a mythmaker.
Transaction costs preserve the anthropology of economics: individuals are still the basic unit of social life
(regardless of what other disciplines may say), and individuals contract to get things done. Thus the social is a
product of individual action), which feels more scientific
(since called methodological individualism). When the
social stubbornly reappears in firms and other hierarchical settings, and ordering cannot plausibly be ascribed to
contract or price, then the social can be explained as an
artifact of implicit bargaining over implicit costs. More
ambitiously still, the distribution of rights and the correlative imposition of constraints are understood not as
artifacts of power or belief or history, but as legal approximations to negotiations only imagined. Thus both
social organization and law (and presumably government) are understood as if they were contractual in origin. The market is ubiquitous, and economics remains
the queen of the social sciences, even in the absence of
actual transactions with real money. Or, to put it differently, Coase rearticulates the Hobbesian social contract
for those trained in economics.
Transaction costs are thus deeply speculative, indeed
subjunctive, treated as if they had happened in fact,
when, quite simply, they have not. It is important to remember that there is neither a transaction nor, therefore, a cost to doing the transaction. The "cost" is an
assigned value, not an observed price. Coase's great
metaphor relies on a deep comfort, widespread in a
commercial society, with both the idea of money as a
unit of account and the arithmetical consequences of
accounting. So we unselfconsciously speak of the negative value of a company; we may assert that, if one share
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is worth $100, then the owner of ten million shares has a
billion dollar stake; we may ascribe the difference between book value and price to "goodwill" and be done.
The arithmetic is sound, but we are not talking about
money in use, transactions, or the world. Similarly, with
transaction costs, the difficulties of doing that which is
not done are "priced," or more commonly, it is asserted
that their price would be higher than the course of action taken (the formation of a firm, the granting of an
entitlement).
After Coase, there is a "price" for what is purchased,
and a price for what is not purchased or even offered.
By way of analogy, consider how the natural numbers,
which count what is, imply negative numbers, which
quantify what is not. To shift metaphors slightly, transaction costs "balance the books" on social life, much as
the concept of equity balances a balance sheet. Such
concepts flow from the structure of formal thought, and
so are convincing, but are also deeply, profoundly, unempirical. And it is another irony of intellectual history
that throughout his life Coase insisted on the importance
of empirical work in economics.
After transaction costs, the domain of economics is not
the study of actual transactions, or even of plausible
transactions on real goods and services, but of conceivable transactions, i.e., social ordering that might be described transactionally. Some things have prices; other
things have transaction costs. Thus money goes from
being an asset class, situated in a social and institutional
matrix, to a symbol for universal value. That accomplished, everything could be articulated in terms of contract, even when no contract was to be seen. Thus
transaction costs make economics capable of articulating
most all of social life, adjudicating "social arrangements."
This view is both profoundly reassuring (it reassures us
of our liberal autonomy) and powerfully conservative
(this is the world, more or less, for which we have bargained.) To be more specific, Coase, especially as radicalized by Stigler, appeals to several elites. For academic
economists, transaction costs vastly extend the reach of
their discipline, and more delightfully still, make economics logically prior to law (and by extension, culture
itself), which fit nicely with the traditional aspiration to
speak with the a priori imperiousness of a natural science. Coase was aware of this: "it is my view that the
approach used in that article ["The Problem of Social
Cost"] will ultimately transform the structure of microeconomics -- and I will explain why." This expansive notion of transactional costs had serious downsides. It ap-

peared empirical, but licensed raw speculation. It turned
on a frivolous notion of money, but then again, money
has always been something of an embarrassment to microeconomics.
For capitalists, transaction costs provided both an apology for the status quo and, more importantly, a political
economy for which regulation was always a second-best
solution. The financial deregulation of recent years
would not have been imaginable without great faith in
the ability of sophisticated, and not so sophisticated,
actors to reach socially beneficial agreements regarding
things like default risk.
The appeal of the Coase theorem, and to lesser extent
the "Theory of the Firm," to legal scholars is somewhat
puzzling. While many law professors resisted the impulse to explain the world in terms of implicit contracts
and around alleged costs (the even more speculative
reliance on alternative uses of factors of production has
been, to my knowledge, ignored), more subscribed. This
is odd. One might have thought that lawyers would viscerally sense the importance of history, of power, of institutional arrangements -- of lots of things besides contract, implicit or not, to understanding social privilege.
And surely lawyers should emphasize the difficult and
uncertain and hence very partial nature of contracts,
which they are taught in their first year of law school? It
is something of a mystery, but I think Coase's texts suggested a very appealing vision of social order, in which
property entitlements, civil institutions, marketplace
action, and law itself make sense in terms of one another, and where the comfortable individual retains his
sense of self-worth. Under the spell of such a vision, law
could allay its ancient anxiety of being groundless, illegitimate, faithless. This is not the place to develop such
speculations about the spiritual history of my profession.
For now, it is worth commemorating a marvelous mind if
an accidental poet, and also remembering that there are
reasons Plato cautions against poetry.
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INET event of interest to PhD students
The Winter School on Law and Finance includes a 4-day course on the legal theory of finance taught by Katharina
Pistor, Brigitte Haar, and Dan Awrey. The school takes place in Paris on January 6-9 and the application deadline is
November 18.
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